The creation and annihilation of money and its economic effects are reviewed. Economic values appear "in the mind" of the market participants; e.g., by pretending, maintaining and achieving a particular price for a certain asset. Upon its creation by banks, this kind of "value phantasy" is converted into "real money" often in terms of buyer's debt accompanied by a simultaneous payment of fiat money to the seller. This money is then multiplied on the money market and is competing against other money supplies for the traded assets, goods and services, where it may cause dilution, inflation and reallocation of resources.
ria and not on dynamical processes of creation, annihilation and (re-)distribution of wealth and marketed assets. Indeed, economics seems to be preoccupied with unique equilibria -probably to be able to write down equations -the most famous being the equality of supply and demand at a (single proper) market price. Alas, for various reasons, economic equilibrium theories are inappropriate [5, 6] :
(i) The market participant might suffer from an overload of information, accompanied by a lack of reliable criteria or authorities to evaluate the information, or are fed with disinformation.
The perpetual flow of spontaneous news and opinions via the media make impossible the formation of a "communication equilibrium." As markets tend to become virtualized, it is not totally unreasonable to suspect that those who control; i.e., possess and pay through ads, the media control the market and public policy. Thus the modern markets are driven by whatever communication and (dis)information is fed into them. (Hayek used this argument to argue for an open market as opposed to a (centrally) planned economy [7] .)
(ii) The intra-market dynamics might not be sufficiently efficient to settle prices; or there may be no convergence towards a single price, but rather price cycles and other more chaotic regimes.
(iii) Market participants do not always act rationally. For instance, they tend to hold true what they would like to believe, are overconfident, optimistic and copy other people's actions.
The phantasies, greed, emotions and expectations of market participants as well as monopolies might introduce random and irrational bias. The same illusory, enthusiastic expectations which push prices up to record levels drag prices down in times of fear and crises. (This behavior is not dissimilar to somebody suffering from bipolar disorder.) (iv) Trade policies and military deployment might enforce prices.
(v) The volume creation and annihilation of money and debt by governments, (central) banks, corporations and individuals might not allow a stabile settlement of prices by creating (expectations of) a chaotic regime.
(vi) As money and its various forms and derivatives is itself marketed, the price of money becomes recursive, self-referential and reflexive; with all consequences known from classical recursion theory [8, 9] ; in particular diagonalization.
Traditional economics also seems to overemphasize the rationality and loyalty of market participants and their willingness to Gentlemen-like "stick to the rules." Indeed, experience demonstrates the contrary: investment money is anonymous and stripped from the identity of the person or institution investing. Profits and the increase of wealth are almost inevitable the sole measure of financial conduct. Hence, those participants winning over alternative modes of conduct by circumventing and breaking the rules will be the heroes of the markets. The trading floor of every stock or commodity exchange resembles more a war room then an agora; this reflects the ongoing "bellum omnium contra omnes." So, whenever there is an opportunity and a loophole available, there eventually will be someone exploiting it. Only in times of crisis and bust their investors blame their investment bankers for taking too much risk and loosing, whereas in times of bubble the latter ones are hailed the prophets of the day.
Another apparent tendency of economics (e.g., Refs. [10, 11] ) is its sometimes apologetic use of formalism. This is occasionally counterbalanced by uninspired attempts to apply techniques known from theoretical physics such as the Feynman path integral (e.g., Ref. [12] ) to the markets.
In what follows, we shall investigate the consequences of certain dynamical economic behaviors in a rather straightforward manner in the analytic tradition of Hume [13] , Wicksell [2, 3] , Schneider [4] , Friedman [14] and Binswanger [6] which presents a form of "dynamic accountancy" and the quantity theory of money.
II. MONEY
Money is a unit or measure of economic values and thus of price, a unit of account, as well as a store of value [10, 11] . In a transaction, money serves as a medium of exchange and trade. Money is also a unit or measure of dept used in a settlement of a debt [2, 4] requiring ownership property which could serve as a collateral [15] .
Money is created and destroyed in several ways. In what follows, we shall consider a bounded market domain such as a country, e.g., the United States of America, or a collection of countries with a common market policy, such as the Euro-zone within the European Union. We shall use the following market participants:
(i) The Central Bank is capable of creating central bank money in the associated currency, such as for instance "cash" (i.e., central bank notes or coins), or central bank accounts.
(ii) The (commercial) banks are capable of creating bank money such as a transactional checking account. Banks earn money by lending money and receiving interest.
(iii) The creditors and investors (previously [2, 3] called capitalists) present capital or other assets. In return they earn interest.
(iv) The recipients or debtors borrow money in the expectation of future profits. In return they pay interest.
A. Primary money creation by banks
It is not totally unreasonable to state that modern central and commercial banks are "clearing houses" transforming "thin air" or assets into money (and back). Just how this is done will be reviewed below [4] . As the ratio between the amounts of money created by the commercial banks as compared to the amount of money created by the central bank tends to increase in time, the commercial banks, and to a much lesser degree the central banks are responsible for the amount of money created. Let us consider a few cases how this comes about.
Monetarization
One form of money creation by a (central) bank is by monetarization of non-monetary assets.
Thereby, the (central) bank acquires (and then owns) assets which do not serve as means of payments. The banks pays for these assets by creating accounts which hold money secured by itself;
i.e., by the (central) bank.
Monetarization represents a straightforward flow of money from someone selling the asset to the bank; i.e., In this process, the bank acquires both asset and dept (balanced by the ownership of that asset).
Examples of monetarization are the acquisition of (i) real estate, (ii) shares in a business (iii) claims of (future) taxes and (iv) foreign money.
Checks and "I Owe You" 's
In a very similar way banks create money in transactional checking accounts by buying from somebody owning checks or I Owe You's (IOUs) drawn from a third party. In this case, the bank then holds the title. This can be schematically represented by
Money creation via credit and debt
The bank grants money to an entrepreneur or investor for acquiring some asset. In this process, the bank serves as an intermediary between the investor who is the recipient of money (in the form of a bank account). At the same time, the investor becomes debtor; i.e.,
The bank receives (future) securities (such as mortgages and other rights) on the properties of the investor (borrower) and at the same time transfers credit money to the investor. For example, credit money is lent to someone (i) buying real estate, or (ii) investing into a business, or (iii) a client or state preparing and conducting a (legal) war in hope of (future) taxes and bait.
For investments, interest rates always compete with the rate of profit of the investment: the lower the interest rate, the more it may be worthwhile to pursue and maintain also low-profit business.
The price of the credit is the interest, which at the same time is the gain and award of the bank for taking the risk of lending out money. Indeed, the interest paid on credit is a major source of income of a commercial bank. Thus the creation of credit money presents a business opportunity for commercial banks: banks love to create credit, despite the fact that in times of crises they suffer from bad loans and default of payment. Conversely, they accept money as deposits only insofar as this money contributes to their reserve, thereby enlarging their capacity to generate credit. In order to generate more income, banks are ingenious in creating an ever increasing amount of credit, thereby increasing their income proportionately.
Indeed, the generation of credit money without sound bases has been the origin of several monetary and economic crises. In the Great Depression, credit was used as a speculative investment into stocks, and the lending of credit to borrowers deemed "subprime" initiated the recent "credit crunch."
In the presented regime, money is annihilated essentially in reverse order as it is created. This is expressible by inverting the arrows in the previous schema; i.e., by (i) the bank selling off assets and (ii) by repayment of debt to the banks.
Any money contraction process is painful for the market because money is withdrawn and extracted from it, resulting in a loss of liquidity. Therefore, as absurdly as ist may sound, it might be better for market stability and growth that this shock never happens; that is, if the principal of credit is never paid back but is constantly refinanced. This, effectively, is the argument of some economists claiming that the perpetual maintenance of the United States trade deficit is essential and beneficial for her trade partners and the rest of the world.
C. Time scales
In the absurd limit, one piece of money would be sufficient for all transactional purposes. The bigger the economy and the market, the faster would have to be the circulation of this piece of money. Thus, at least to a certain extent, the scarcity of money could be compensated by the rapidity of its turnaround. In the real economy, turnaround cycles might be limited by natural processes. These limitations are less important for virtual money in virtual markets.
D. Money supply multiplication
In principle, commercial banks should be interested to grant as many loans as possible, since the more loans are issued, the more interest (and provisions) is paid to them. These interests and provisions contribute to the profits of the bank. An unlimited possibility of banks to create credit money via debt would thus flood the markets with credit money. This credit money would then compete on the market for the scarce assets against money from other sources such as salaries or investments or profits from businesses. The money creation by banks is no linear process when it is iterated and occurs recursively.
Consider, for the sake of demonstration, somebody selling off a section of land to some buyer.
This seller is left with money which he could reinvest, for instance by buying a much bigger section of land as previously owned, with the money earned by selling the previous section, plus the mortgage money (created by the bank) on the new section. The seller of this latter section may do the same, and so on, in principle ad infinitum. This may amounts in an explosive growth of money from a finite seed.
Or, somebody owning money could go to a bank and put the money into an account. The bank could then use some part or all of the money obtained as a reserve against sudden withdrawal and issue new bank money -exceeding the original amount of money -in terms of credit against debt. These new loans cound then be reinvested and fed back into the banking system, which would treat this new money in essentially the same way as reserve and issue new bank money in terms of credit against debt. This process could go on forever, resulting in a limited increase of money supply at best (if the ratio between the principal of the credit and the money put into the bank is strictly smaller than one) and into an unlimited avalanche or shock of money causing hyperinflation at worst. Schematically, one may write
The individual act of every such money multiplication can be formalized by the money multiplication ratio defined by the ratio between the bank money created via credit and the money deposited in the bank; i.e., (money multiplication ratio) = (bank money created via credit for debtor) (money deposited by investor) .
The amount of money created in this way is the sum of a geometric progression, with the money multiplication ratio as common factor. The behavior of this geometric series in terms of iterations is discussed in Appendix A.
A somewhat similar situation occurs through refinancing: as long as the value or potential price of an asset goes up (and some rating agency is willing to certify this), a debtor may pay the interest with new debt ad infinitum.
Money in the "golden days"
It is quite natural to ask whether and how it is possible in this scenario to curb this lending activities by the banks and thus limit the money supply from money creation processes. In the "golden days" when money was tied to gold, the goldsmiths used to issue anonymous notes based on their gold reserves, and the amount of credit was limited by the reserves in gold they possessed or were trusted with.
Of course, they had to set aside some "cash gold" for people redeeming their notes. Statistically, the laws of probability require that, in the case of a "large" number of customers ( (i) In a "golden" scenario, the amount of available money would depend on the volume of gold, which is strongly dependent on factors which are external to the economy, among them technology, the chance to find new gold deposits, the industrial usage of gold, and the occupation of gold-rich civilizations. This is hardly useful for a dynamic economy in need of liquidity not limited to the amount of some precious commodity.
(ii) The resulting volatility in price -the ups and downs on the market -would seriously hamper the realization of some preliminary price frame, the expectations of future income, and ultimately trade and investment activities.
(iii) If the production of goods and services, as for instance counted in the accumulated gross domestic product exceeds the amount of gold -as has been the case in the late nineteenth century -there will be deflation, since there will be more and more goods per unit of money. In the limit of higher and higher production of goods relative to the available gold reserves, money becomes infinitely valuable, which means that, effectively, nobody can afford it.
(iv) International conflicts such as wars and other excessively expensive investment activities will be strongly penalized if not made impossible for countries maintaining the gold standard (thus favoring those countries abandoning it), since the amount of money and thus the ability to finance a conflict or an investment is strictly limited by the gold reserves that happen to be available.
Fiat money
To circumvent the volume limits of the gold standard, influential groups, financial authorities and governments have abandoned the gold standard in favor of fiat money which is not directly (without any market and pricing) exchanged by any precious commodity such as gold. Alternatively, it is backed by some "trustworthy" authority; in most cases the central bank or the government itself. A piece of money is fiat money if its nominal or "face value" (e.g., the value it has in payment of taxes) is higher than its market value as a commodity.
In the times of the gold standard, one just had to make sure that all creators of gold-backed money really had a sufficient backing of gold at their disposal; otherwise they would have produced gold in the British "Pound Sterling area" and the USA, and the fixed redemption of gold to the dollar had to be given up in favor of liquidity and US federal deficits. Afterwards, the U.S. dollar celebrated its comeback as the only currency in which crude oil, the "black gold" has to be traded (although not at a fixed price).
In times of fiat money not directly (without market) redeemable in gold or other precious commodities, there has to be another way to curb inflation and thus the money supply. Note that, with fiat money, the emphasis is on the authority to create money. Because in principle, without authority anybody could take a piece of paper and create a "money note" by writing an amount of currency on it.
E. Money increase through interest paid
The increase in the monetary base through credit makes necessary not only the generation of credit money by the banks but also the creation of money "compensating" the interest paid for these credit, because at the end of the credit cycle, when a credit is paid back, the debtor has not only paid back the principal, but also the (compound) interest. Thus in order to avoid deflation, the aggregate money supply must at least grow as strong as the aggregate interest; i.e.,
(aggregate money supply) ≥ (aggregate interest).
From exactly where this "new" money should come from -despite new credit to somebody else buying these products -remains unclear; one possibility would be the creation of new money by the (central) banks via a reassessment and revaluation of assets in possession. The latter possibility would require inflation.
F. Limits on and control over money creation
In principle, there is no limit on the creation of fiat money by banks. Thus, if price stability is the goal, in order to prevent the effect of too much competing money for the marketed goods (resulting in inflation), the rate of money creation and destruction should be fine-tuned to the growth and decline of the marketed assets. If such a delicate balance [6] between the available assets and services (e.g., measured in terms of of the gross domestic product) on the one hand and the available money on the other hand can be controlled and maintained over long periods of time by the standard measures of central banks (influencing the credit activity and the multiplicity of money supply via the interest rates) remains highly questionable. The Author tends to agree with Soros' rather pessimistic views [5] that occasional bust phases are inevitable.
Reserve policies
One of the methods invented for issuing "too much" fiat money is to require the commercial banks to keep a certain ratio of the generated credit money as central bank capital reserve. Also, it is claimed that the money multiplication ratio is maintained strictly smaller that one, thus preventing explosive growth of the money supply.
This method has proven to be notoriously difficult to establish and control, as commercial banks and investment firms, in collaboration with rating agencies and accountants, have invented various ingenious ways to shift and hide credit and debt from, or "sideways around," their books. One possibility which has been widely discussed, practiced and criticized lately is the packaging and bundling of debt into (mortgage) funds.
Dependence between interest rate, volume of money and price
Another, seemingly much more efficient, though paradoxical, instrument of money volume control is the fixing of interest rates by the central bank, which is then translated into adjusting interest rates in the commercial bank sector. There are two conflicting views about the connection between interest rates and the resulting volume of money resulting in inflation:
Indirect dependence
In the first view, the higher the interest, the less business projects appear to be profitable enough to support that interest. Also, the consumption of commodities will decline. As a result, only those projects will remain whose expected profitability is higher than the interest rate; all others will be either not started or be discontinued. This curbs the amount of credit money by reducing the amount of investments.
The unfavorable side effect of this measure is the resulting contraction of the economy, because economic growth is linked to investment and credit. As less and less money is available and more and more consumers have to curb their spending (for instance by getting unemployed and living on some kind of "social welfare"), a downward spiral of activity may result, which is the reverse of the upward spiral [6] of growth.
The observation that increasing interest rates could result in a contraction of (credit) money and thus in a decrease of prices and inflation was already observed around 1900 [3] , despite some empirical evidence to the contrary.
Direct dependence
In the second view, one may argue that, confronted with high interest rates, a business has to surcharge its customers with a higher product price resulting from the higher interest paid for financing and maintaining the production. In a very similar way, increasing cost factors such as increasing commodity (i.e., energy) prices contribute to inflation, because investment capital is just one cost factor among several. This contributes to inflation and has and adverse effect to the deflatory tendency just discussed.
The Author knows of no recent systematic empirical study investigating which one of the effect prevails under certain circumstances. 1 More empirical data seem to be needed in order to be able to state the effects of changes of the interest rates. A first glance at the inflation rate and interest rate data for the U.S. economy depicted in Fig. 1 shows some correlations. (Note that these correlations might also be established by the believe of the market participants in the capability of the Federal Reserve System to be able to stabilize markets and prices via variations of interest rates.)
Why, for instance, it should be in the powers of the European Central Bank to stop the strongly increasing oil and and other commodity costs (originating from higher demand from China, India and elsewhere) by raising the interest rate for the Euro remains a mystery to the Author. Of course, if the European Central Bank would effectively ruin the European economy by imposing too high prices for interest (money investments), then the demand for oil and other commodities would drop, which would very likely result in lower prices of these goods temorarily. Surely one should not presume that the European Central Bank would sacrifice the well-doing of the European economy for price stability in the rest of the world! Even granted that being correct, the collaterals of these measures in terms of a lowering in economic growth or even recession, unemployment, poverty and the related human misery and social instability are so severe that they 1 In observing economic arguments, one is sometimes reminded of an apocryphal story about the Vienna-born MITPhysicist Victor Weisskopf. One day a student entered his office, telling Weisskopf that he had just been to Vienna and rided an old tram there. On the ceiling of the tram the student identified two adjacent ventilators running in opposite directions. Weisskopf thought for a while and explained the student why this has to be so. A year later the same student entered Weisskopf's office again, declaring that he has visited Vienna a second time, and that, on closer inspection, had found out that the ventilators on the tram ceiling circulated in the same direction. Upon hearing this, Weisskopf allegedly jumped up and cried out loudly: "oh, but that can be explained even more easily!" should be administered with extreme care.
III. PRICE
Since the days of Adam Smith [17] , Economics [10, 11] defines price in a market as the value of a good in terms of money; that is, money (per asset) is the unit of price. Stated differently, in the economic context the informal notion of value is formalized by a concrete, definite fixation of price, which thus reflects the beliefs and behaviors of all market participants.
Ideally, the price (as well as the appropriated quantities of variable supply) is settled in a market subject to supply and demand by an equilibrium of the latter two [18, 19] . We have already discussed some of the factors contributing to the fifficulties in establishing a unique equilibrium on the market resulting in price volatility.
A. Price formation by interest rates
For scarce assets which are considered important and central in life, potential sellers tend to bet on ever increasing prices of their assets. Potential buyers tend to go to their "financial limits"
(and sometimes beyond) to acquire these assets. Let us consider housing as an example for scarce and highly demanded resources. The high demand for real estate properties reflects the particular importance and the relevance of proper accommodation to individuals and families. The price of a property is not directly related to any potential future income but seems to be solely determined by the portion of the household income available for the payment of dept accepted for acquiring that property; i.e., (price of property) ≤ (available houshold income) (interest rate) .
As a result, property prices tend to increase on decreasing interest rates. The leverage or ratio of this price increase is determined by the inverse interest rate. In the (absurd) limit, with "free credit" associated with zero interest rate, a single buyer would be able to bid an unlimited price for any given property. By unrealistically assuming those prices will not go up due to competing money, the buyer could acquire all properties available on the market.
B. Role of rating agencies and assessors
This modes of money creation require that the value; i.e., the price, of the asset is determined.
The role of rating agencies, reviewers and assessors in this respect is of great importance. Corruption, e.g., direct or indirect influence and manipulation by the customers (and payers 2 ), bad expertise or just laissez-faire (let do) whatever the market seems to dictate is detrimental. Nevertheless, it has to be accepted that assessors and rating agencies cannot evaluate "against the market for a very long time," simply because of the fact that they would "rate themselves out of business."
Ultimately, only those rating agencies will be successful which conform to the expectations of their customers.
C. Pyramid schemes and vicious cycles
A pyramid scheme is a non-sustainable business model which assumes ever increasing prices (money supply) or a constant multiplicity of participation. One formalization of such schemes is a geometric progression with a common ratio of strictly greater than one. Although no market participant might intend such a pursuit, the boom phases on stock or real estate markets tend to behave not in a dissimilar manner. In such a scenario, the last investor buying the shares or property before the market slump is the one suffering most.
Another behavior is the (vicious) cycle [5, 6] in which an economy spirals up and down. It is extremely difficult to break a psychological barrier originating in negative expectations of investors for future demand and profit. In times of crises, it appears prudent for an individual to take not too many risks and not to invest too much; but common prudency sometimes amounts to a general market downturn and in a decline of the economy, or in a quasi-stable state of low employment and living standard.
D. Price and trade volumes
Under "normal conditions," in the real estate and other financial, stock and commodity markets, prices are formed under the assumption of the market participants that at any given time only a tiny fraction of commodities is for sale -like the tip of an iceberg. If for instance all (or at least large parts of) the world's gold reserves, or all the properties in Europe, or all the stocks traded in the New York stock exchange would become available for sale at once, prices would plunge dramatically, and would presumably tend to zero, regardless of the soundness of such investments.
Thus it makes no operational sense to contemplate on the "price of all the European land," or all the "available gold," or "all the stocks traded," or the "price in Euro of all New Zealand Dollars."
Likewise, the absolute value of a company cannot be directly related to the number of its stocks times the price per stock. Rather, they reflect a price of the share on the condition of the available volumes of supply and demand. Nonetheless it makes operational sense to speak of the value of some assets in any given finite portfolio which is small enough not to effect prices by selling it off.
E. Not all money contributes to price formation
As long as some money is "locked" into some investment, it does not compete on the market with money from other sources and therefore is irrelevant for price formation. For the sake of demonstration, let us assume the seller of a real estate property uses his money (i) to buy a new property; (ii) to buy stocks in a stock exchange; (iii) to put the savings aside in a bank account for later use; (iv) to buy a boat; (v) or gives the money away to charity to buy food for the poor. Only in the latter case (v) the money obtained from the sale of a real estate property will compete with other money to buy food. In case (i) it is re-invested into the real estate sector of the economy. In case (ii) it is re-invested into the shareholding sector of the economy. In case (iii) it is re-invested into the banking sector. In case (iv) it is used with other money in the boat market.
To give another example, suppose a person has just made a huge profit on the money market. As long as this person re-invests this profit into stocks, the price of, say, real estate in New Zealand's Northland will remain unaffected. However, if the same person phantasizes to settle in Northland and starts buying up land close to, say, Whale Bay in Matapouri, prices will go up there.
In general, while it is true that money can be converted into any form of marketed commodity, its effect in the market and thus its relevance with respect to price formation depends on the particular economic segment in which it is invested. Therefore it makes no operational sense to state that "suchandsuch money contributes to general inflation." Because if, for instance, it remains within a narrow sector of the economy, it could have zero effect on other sectors. It is only when these sectors communicate -by transforming value in terms of a flow of money from one sector into another -that one sector will influence another.
In principle, every influx of money affects the price in the sector invested. Some segments of an economy may thus "lift off" or get "dephased" or "withdrawn" from other sectors; in particular from "Main street," where people sell their work and their life's time for money. On a much larger scale, this issue comes up in the pricing of certain raw materials and commodities as compared to the production of goods, as well as in regional pricing. of whether or not parents could pass on the acquired wealth to their children versus giving every child the opportunity to make the best out of life, independent of the previous achievements by the parents. 3 Theoretically, it could be expected that, by pursuing similar re-investment strategies, second-or third-round effects are just iterations of the first round of investments. Thus, the effective (non-)consumption ratio of the quantities of money that go into commodities and consumption, versus money that goes into store or other non-consumption purposes in terms of the available aggregate of money can be defined by r c = (consumption ratio) = (money for consumption) (available aggregate of money) , r n = (non-consumption ratio) = (money for non-consumption) (available aggregate of money) .
Note that r c + r n = 1. In what follows, we shall abbreviate A = (available aggregate of money). Suppose the quantities of money in different sectors are grouped into a vector defined in a linear vector space whose dimension is the number of such sectors in the model. For the sake of demonstration, consider a model with only two sectors, namely a consumption sector and a non-consumption sector; i.e., v 0 = A(r c , r n ). Then, after i iterations, the original amount A gets dispersed as v i = A(r c r i n , r i+1 n ), which, in the infinite time limit (i.e., i → ∞), for r n < 1, dies out as v ∞ = (0, 0).
V. NECESSITIES FOR GROWTH AND PROSPERITY
It has been argued by economists (e.g., Keynes [21] ) concerned with possible unfavorable quasi-stabile equilibria characterized by high unemployment, declining profits and slow economic growth that it is important to keep the money supply and the investment levels high; sometimes even at the price of excessive government deficit spending. Others (e.g., Hayek [7] ) argue that, in order to avoid (hyper-)inflation and the associated lack of control of the economy by the (central) banks, these instruments should be applied with great care.
A. Profit incentives
Note that growth can only happen if some new assets or services are produced and presented which did not exist previously. In order for that to happen, the manufacturers could either use money set aside for investments previously, or take credit money (and the associated debt). For the latter, presumably more often occurring situation, the expected profit rate (per invested unit of money) should exceed the expected interest rate; i.e., (expected interest rate) < (expectated profit rate).
Otherwise, no capitalist would finance a money consuming business. Thus a necessary condition for an economy to grow is that the rate of interest on money is kept sufficiently low to allow profits.
B. Bootstrap theory of economic cycles
There are at least two main arguments supporting the "creation of new money:" (i) the increase of assets and services available for money purchases, as well as (ii) the necessity to repay interest on the bank credits. Why should an additional amount of money not produce a higher amount of available, competing money per asset or service, thereby causing inflation?
There exists a third, temporal factor in money increase which is associated with a time lag between the consumption and investments made possible with the additionally created money, and its inflationary effect. In the extreme, new money might be so efficiently invested that through these investments the volume of goods or services (over-)compensate for the additional money influx into the markets, thereby stabilizing the prices. Already Hume [13 
VI. WHAT COULD MAYBE DONE
With regards to the supply of money and its required volume, apparently there seem to be two kind of strategies: (i) to supply the markets with liquidity and thus to "print money," or (ii) to attempt to contain the money volume by "printing no money." This, of course, has very little to do with really printing cash notes, but mainly with encouraging, allowing or penalizing -through lower or higher interest rates -the creation of money via credit and debt. In terms of central banks, this translates into (i) "to lower the interest rate" and "lower the criteria of eligible security and reserves" for loans versus (ii) "to keep interest rates 'high"' and to "maintain strict minimal reserve standards."
As it turns out, monetary policy makers at the Federal Reserve have been favoring the high liquidity strategy (i), arguing that the containment strategy (ii) has build up or even caused the Great Depression of the 1920/30's. From an economics point of view, it is exciting to observe the effects of this conduct; in particular whether or not all this liquidity will inflate the markets in the long run, thereby causing extraordinary price rises.
Alas, it might not be unfair to state that -beyond some very localized effects on the economy -central banks seem to have only limited influence on the money supply and on pricing. In times of bang and bust, market participants don't care very much what the central bankers say or do.
Despite advises to behave prudently, they try (even by borrowing investment money) to make as much profit as possible; and they try to save what is left in declining price rallies. Overall, they expect the central banks to behave according to their expectations. 4 There is only one certainty: a central bank could easily ruin the economy by fixing the interest at 4 In this respect, one central banker told the Author off records his impression that "the tail wags the dog." either too high or too levels, thereby creating a liquidity crisis, either resulting in a money volume collapse, or in (hyper-)inflation, respectively. Indeed, Friedman suggested to "abolish the Federal
Reserve and replace it with a computer," effectively replacing central banks with a mechanical system that would keep the quantity of money going up at a steady rate; e.g., proportional to the gross domestic product [14] .
The markets' behavior seem to be strongly determined and biased by the expectations of the participants. Almost everything (good or bad) seems to be possible if a sufficient number of market participants believe in it for a sufficiently long time. Therefore, it might not be unjustified to state that probably the most important criterion for a prospering market and economy is the creation and maintenance of a belief in prosperity and growth. Thus sometimes maybe marketing is more important than monetary measures.
This leaves individuals and policy makers with a very uneasy feeling towards economic issues; probably the most disturbing being the lack of control over the markets. Whatever measures are taken -presently, the most important is the setting of central bank interest rates, as well as setting the standards for reserves and securities backing credits -their effects on the economy remain obscure and very difficult to predict. Thus, from the point of view of the natural sciences, economics still requires a lot of attention, both theoretically as well as empirically.
APPENDIX A: Geometric progression and series
A geometric progression (geometric sequence) is a sequence of numbers where each term after the first a 0 is the previous term times a fixed non-zero number called the (common) ratio r; i.e., a k+1 = a k r and thus a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k , . . ., a n = a 0 , a 0 r, a 0 r 2 , . . . , a 0 r k , . . . , a 0 r n .
An example of a geometric expression is the compound interest under the assumption of a constant interest rate p. If a 0 is the principal, then a 0 (1 + p) k is the amount due after k years. The growth of this function for various values of p over time n is depicted in Fig. 2 .
A geometric series is the sum of all the numbers in a geometric progression; i.e., By multiplying all sides with 1 − r, the sum can be rewritten as Depending on the value of the common ration, there are seven regimes (depicted in Fig. 3 ), such that in the limit of "large" k → ∞, (i) for r < −1, r n → ±∞, and thus the sum diverges, with ever increasing zigzag values.
(ii) for r = −1, r n → (−1) n , and thus the sum diverges in a constant zigzag movement between 1 and 0.
(iii) for −1 < r < 0, r n → 0, and thus, in an ever diminishing zigzag movement, the sum con- 
